"India must present itself as the alternative to China."  

These words by Kenneth Juster, former American ambassador to India, are more than a mere nudge to the possible course of Indian foreign policy. They subtly unveil the United States' desires of an increased interaction, integration, and interdependence with India. With a recent strategic framework involving the country to contain China's “illiberal influence", India's rising status in American foreign policy can be owed to the pluralistic and powerful nature of both states' democracies.

So, at a time when India is wrestling with its liberal identity—a characteristic triad of democracy, diversity, and development—would America and other western democracies deter from engaging with India? For one thing, these past months have explicitly revealed the West's growing cognizance of the Indian democratic backslide. Western institutions have paid close attention to the decline of India's freedom index and its lapse into an 'electoral autocracy.' By claiming that Indian politics is refuge to a personality cult, they signal both their awareness and disapproval over the turn of the country's political discourse.

Will this popular backlash suspend Western, particularly American, engagement with India?

Counterbalancing China

Since the conclusion of the second World War, American agendas have sought to create a sustainable, security architecture—one that is punctuated by American preeminence and the rules-based 'Liberal International Order'. Containing Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific has, consequently, emerged as the strategy of countless administrations. On a similar note, India too is deeply invested in safeguarding its territorial integrity against intermittent Chinese intrusion. Therefore, aligning their common objectives to counter the belligerence of a common enemy favours both India and the United States. Moreover, India considers itself as the net security provider for its immediate and greater neighbourhood. It is, therefore, welcoming of American economic investment, technological expertise, and arms trade to balance Chinese aggression.

Within Asia, additionally, India is best equipped with the human resources capable of rivalling China's economic leverage. Disengaging with India on the pretext of its political identity, therefore, forms part of an unfounded and vain decision—one that might hinder the American agenda of containing China. A similar sentiment is expressed in the comments by leaders of the Quad (consistent of India and the United States)—"our foundations of democracy and a commitment to engagement unite us." Thus, explicitly revealing America's plans of deepening engagement with India.

To seriously contain China, it is only logical for the United States to continue, if not deepen, its partnership with India.

Learning from the Past

To answer the above question, it is vital to refer to past circumstances of Indo-Western cooperation, most notably The India-U.S.Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative. This agreement not only helped India secure access to critical technologies in strategic sectors, but also accredited the country as a responsible and strongly non-proliferant state. It marked a key turning point in Indo-American relations; one that heralded an era of wide-ranging bilateral cooperation.  

Moreover, it is worth noting that the deal was met by strong opposition in the United States. What dispelled widespread concerns, which also happened to make their way to Congress, was the appealing nature of India's democracy. In her opening remarks to the Senate, then-Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, praised the transparent, stable, and multi-ethnic Indian democracy while acknowledging the same as a natural realm of cooperation with the United States.

On a similar note, Ashley Tellis (a senior advisor who played a crucial role in the deal) put forth that India's democratic identity was an indisputable strength that "brings only benefits for Asian stability and American Security." Consequently, the success of the deal rested on India's liberal, democratic structure and on Washington's willingness to convince other countries of the same (even when the necessity of counterbalancing China was imminent).

Hence, as the world's largest democracy, India wields a particular kind of 'soft power'—one that entices western dialogue and promotes increased cooperation. Could the degeneration of this 'soft power' deter western eagerness to partner with India? That said, the West's tendencies to align with tyrants and despots—in order to pursue their vested interests—cannot be ignored.

The 'Rising Power' tag

Western engagement with India is not subject to merely the country's political identity. It is, therefore, critical to consider the validity of India's 'Rising Power' tag and whether or not the country can emerge as the economic alternative to China.

India's economy has been experiencing contractions since 2018. Its weakness can be attributed to a melange of both global and structural factors. A steep drop in commodity prices, decreasing international trade (owing to a series of US-China trade wars), and falling industrial output across the world- these cyclical factors have weighed down the country's Aggregate Demand and GDP. Moreover, a series of structural drawbacks have halted the economy's credit expansion and further growth prospects.

Therefore, in the absence of the economic clout to rival China (and aside from its democratic image), what can India offer to the US? Would the West, particularly the US, turn away from a country marked by economic downturns and, worse, a denial for agreeing over even the smallest of trade packages? Blemishes on its democratic identity, then, risk eroding India's allure.

The real task lies not in determining whether or whether not the West will disengage with India. In the context of modern globalisation and our multiplex international order, that is almost irrelevant. Instead, the real task lies in determining the extent to which American engagement, and that by other Western democracies, might be deterred by India's illiberal turn. Cooperation is subject to countless stages and varying intensities of dialogues in between.

This is why, as attested by Prof Paul Staniland, before assessing Indo-Western cooperation post the imposition of an 'illiberal-tax', it is crucial to understand what cooperation might have looked like in the absence of one. Does our situation today emerge as an example of this? Moreover, it is equally important to draw from the past and evaluate the circumstances and corresponding degrees of this 'tax' on other nations. Only then can one draw reasoned conclusions on the extent to which a similar 'tax' might, or might not, be imposed on India.